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Governing Africa’s Seas in the Neoliberal Era 
 
Tarik Dahou and Brenda Chalfin  
Summary  
The governance of the seas has profoundly changed in the 21st century with the explosion of maritime 
transport, the globalization of the exploitation of marine resources, and the growing concern for 
environmental issues. The idea of an integrated policy of seas and oceans management became a 
cornerstone of international and national instruments aiming to regulate maritime circulation and 
exploitation of marine resources. Integrated maritime management policies put emphasis on 
liberalization of the marine sectors and resources and the security agenda, taken in its broad sense to 
guarantee freedom of trade and environmental sustainability. These efforts,  whose putative purpose 
is to combine economic, social and environmental goals, has resulted in an  unsteady balance 
between different sectors, scales and actors and let the door open to controversies, dissent and 
politics. Although the priorities of this global policy agenda continue to transform  the maritime 
governance in Africa, the African states and societies are also actively reshaping it.  While  African 
states  alter international maritime policies according to their own ends, these are also constantly 
molded through struggles over norms, resources and spaces and, conflicts arising from the dialectics 
of possession and dispossession.   
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Introduction 
As blue growth (widely accepted as the sustainable development in the marine and maritime sectors 
as a whole) is gaining increasing traction (Economic commission for Africa 2016 and Ruppel and Biam 
2016), oceans and seas are seen as new frontiers for global capitalism, especially in Africa where 38 
of the 54 states are coastal states and where territorial seas and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) 
represent approximatively 13 million square kilometers. In African countries this trend has spurred a 
new wave of appropriation and control of maritime spaces for blue economy.  At a time of 
unprecedented expansion of global sea trade (90% of African imports and exports are conducted by 
sea), the African continent is facing new security challenges in maritime governance. Amidst 
increasing international fears about sea lane security, African states are expected to strengthen 
control over their maritime territories. The growing exploitation of marine areas is also at the heart 
of this security agenda. Increasing activity in fisheries, mineral extraction and transport, more acute 
than ever, raises concerns about sustainability of maritime resources. From global to local scale, 
integrated maritime policies strive to encompass all these sectors. Until recently, the governance of 
seas and oceans was not a strategic policy priority for African countries, except for South Africa 
endowed with an important navy. Even though the importance of the mineral sector has led African 
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countries to play a key role in negotiating the Law of the Sea convention that shape the EEZ regime 
(Kwiatkowska 1993), the resources invested in the control of the sea beyond legal provisions were 
particularly weak. This is changing with the development of new international policy instruments 
aiming at securing seas and promoting blue growth across Africa’s coastal areas.  
Policy-making regarding maritime spaces is generally studied as a state-centered, with international 
organizations playing a central role oriented towards the militarization of seas. However, this view 
neglects the influence of private actors – embedded both in domestic and transnational capitalist 
networks – and that of local societies, which play a key role in shaping flows of capital and 
commodities as well as transforming norms of regulation. Focusing on state/society relations, this 
article illustrates how African actors appropriate global maritime policies and transform the 
governance of seas and oceans. It maps the territorial distribution of power operating on seas and 
oceans at different spaces and scales. This approach sheds light on how these power dynamics 
transform the boundaries between private and public regulations in different situations. We focus on 
the four key areas of maritime governance: ports, offshore exploitation, security and environment. 
Even though from the perspective of integrated maritime governance, these fields are interwoven, 
they are subject to particular policies. Hence, while focusing on policies in each area separately we 
also analyze their relationships with each other in order to illuminate the complexity of power 
configurations. 
1. Ports and government in the global era 
Reflecting the broad sweep of neoliberal policies and development pathways, across Africa’s 
coastlines the new millennium ushered in a continent-wide process of seaport expansion. Port 
governance, trade circuits, and urban settings are being restructured along with the relationships 
between the persons, commodities, and technologies essential to the functioning of these spaces of 
late-modern mobility and value creation. Simultaneously conditioned by national histories and local 
contexts, these re-arrangements likewise reflect the much wider force-field of the global shipping 
and logistics sector. Marked by the transnationalization of shipping lines, logistics firms, and terminal 
operators, the expansion and acceleration of maritime trade and transit around the globe goes hand 
in hand with the consolidation of industry processes and practitioners (UNCTAD 2017). Africa’s ports 
embody and grapple with the same dynamics.  
Affecting all corners of the continent, among the most prominent outcome is the transfer of port 
assets and operational oversight from state authorities to corporate port concessions. A new species 
of duopoly capital, this move is dominated by just a few firms and their preferred partners in 
shipping. Most prominent is the AP Moller - Maersk partnership operating in Angola, Benin, 
Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, Liberia and Nigeria and Bollore’s alliance with CMA-CGM, evident in 
Cameroon, Togo, Benin, Sierra Leone, Comoros, and Gabon. Also expanding its African foothold is 
Dubai Port World, a former national port authority now turned major multinational player with 
outposts in Algeria, Mozambique, Senegal, Egypt, and until 2016, Djibouti. These firms’ broad reach 
demonstrate that the renewed scope of concession economies across Africa pertains not just to 
extractive enterprise and agricultural land-grabs but to the contracting of what were once considered 
core national infrastructures.  
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 Adding to the consolidation and standardization of port operations across Africa is the rise of 
international security mandates after a brief post-Cold War pax of unfettered global flows. The 
International Shipping and Port Security code prime among them (Chalfin 2009, 2015), these 
directives insist on the implementation of common rules and security controls by all International 
Maritime Organization members. Indicating the interdependence of securitization and marketization 
in late-capitalism, for African players, compliance is key to participation in international supply chains 
and in many cases warrant outsourcing control of key state assets. Reflecting these pressures and 
conditions, three spatial formations prevail in which ports play a central role even if they are not 
always a central place as in earlier orders of maritime commercial circulation.  
The emerging array of African mega-ports is one configuration where ports remain nodal. Involving 
the broad expansion of territorial footprint and port capacity to millions of TEU throughput and 
accommodation of Panamax vessels, African’s mega-ports include Morocco’s Tanger-Med Port, 
Kenya’s Mombasa, Dar es Salaam in neighboring Tanzania, Djibouti’s Doraleh, Togo’s Lome, and 
ground-breaking for many more. A shift from terrestrial to oceanic logics, once remote territorial 
locales - such as Kenya’s Lamu, an old Swahili dhow port (LAPSSET 2017) - are being (re)turned into 
central places of intercontinental maritime connectivity. These investments feed national 
infrastructural imaginaries even as they are driven by international investments and desires (Dua 
2017; Rothenberg 2017) and harbor major environmental impacts (Mendelsohn 2018).  
Decentralized port-based mosaics are the second spatial formation that come with the neo-blue 
economy. Such mosaics are composed of discreet spaces separated and linked through the 
distribution of port functions and service economies across terminals, warehouses, and processing, 
and transshipment zones. Honke and Cuesta-Fernadez (2017:1077) speak of an “Archipelago of 
global territories within which heterogeneous actors claim graduated authority” with regard to the 
port of Dar es Salaam. Shifting the lens from ‘mega’ to ‘micro’ these configurations signal the 
importance of viewing portscapes across terrestrial and oceanic space, what Campling and Colas 
(2017) call the “terraqueous.” Melding production and distribution functions, one example is Ghana’s 
small special-purpose Chinese-financed port designed exclusively to service hydrocarbon extraction 
far off-shore in the shadow of the much larger and older port of Takoradi (Chalfin 2015).  
Multinational trade corridors are the third spatial formation to which contemporary port 
transformation is tied. Found in every corner of the continent, from Cameroon’s port of Douala-Chad 
corridor, to the Trans-Caprivi basin linking DR Congo and Zambia to Namibia’s port of Walvis Bay, or 
the Uganda, Kenya, South Sudan axis linked to the port of Lamu, such configurations are at the heart 
of the contemporary recalibration of cross-continent connections to oceanic worlds.  These dynamics 
are well-captured in the African Governance and Space: Transport Corridors, Border Towns and Port 
Cities in Transition (AFRIGOS) project led by Nugent and Zeller (2016). Linking coastal ports, regional 
cross-national road networks, and in-land depots and supply-lines, they qualify as as highly 
differentiated “technological zones” (Barry 2006). Engendering distinctive cultures of mobility, as 
Zeller’s (2009) research in Namibia attests, they inspire associated forms of break down, resistance, 
and repair, whether filling cracks in the road or translating abstract administrative pacts into 
workable practices. It is important to again note that none of these three formations are entirely 
new. Like the current effort to reclaim a coastal Zanzibari protectorate to facilitate corridor 
development (Mahajan 2017:9), and the shared granting of concessions for Mozambique’s Port of 
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Beira and adjoining interior railroad, most invoke earlier-established places and precedents (Newitt 
and Tornimbeni 2008).  
Such spatial reprisals and reconfigurations are accompanied by unprecedented technological inputs 
and outlooks. They carry major implications for labor and management and strategies of economic 
governance along with the pace of throughput in numerous African ports. From Mombasa (Lamarque 
2018) to Freetown (Stenmanns 2018; Stenmanns and Boeckler 2017), the premium placed on 
mechanization, containerization and automation fosters the de-peopling of the port environment 
and puts the squeeze on dock labor, as in Tanger-Med port (Rothenberg 2017). High-tech port 
operations, many initially adopted in the name of trade facilitation and then repurposed in the 
service of security (Chalfin 2010), also spawn new modes of criminality and illegality, as Lamarque 
(2018) notes for Mombasa in the case of cargo x-ray scanners. These technologies likewise enable – 
and privilege -- new port-based bureaucratic orders, such as Kenya’s Radiation Authority. Networked 
with next-generation logistics technologies such as the geo-referenced “dashboard data 
assemblage,” new systems of port-based governance emerge, like the “global supply chain control 
tower” operating in the port of Freetown (Stenmanns and Boeckler 2018). These real-time imaging 
technologies insert African ports into the dash-board interface of shipping and logistics companies, 
generating a common locus of knowledge and control across divergent locations.  Of note, in Sierra 
Leone’s case a particularly weak state and severely disabled post-war port environment becomes a 
laboratory for technological innovation and experimentation. 
As African ports expand in size, operational complexity, and security, and bring together 
transcontinental and transoceanic circuits of global neoliberalism, urban impacts and entailments are 
substantial. There are the near inevitabilities of population displacement and resettlement due to 
port growth, as evidenced in Dar (Honke and Cuesta-Fernandez 2017) and Ghana’s Tema (Chalfin 
2009). With ports growing not only in size but in value, there are also debates about their worth and 
profitability as national assets. Shaping larger political contests, this is evident in the case of 
Mombasa (Lamarque 2018). Side by side these varied claims to ports infrastructure, personnel, and 
revenue streams, are claims to and the transformative potentials of the commodities that move 
through them. Imported goods alter regional economies and cultures while they revitalize 
surrounding port cities.   
Though driven by different ends, Africa’s neoliberal port restructuring and humanitarian activities 
often partake of common means. Namely, both are highly dependent on supply chain logistical 
efficiencies. In Liberia’s port of Monrovia, it was the World Food Program that kept the port running 
during years of civil conflict. At the end of the war, humanitarian operations were a draw for APM-
Maersk’s bid to rebuild the port and control terminal operations. Similarly, following the outbreak of 
Ebola in neighboring Sierra Leone, humanitarian agencies were a major force insisting the port of 
Freetown remain open (Stenmanns 2018). These examples attest to the resilience of port operations 
and vitality of maritime trade flows in the face of state-failure if not utter breakdown. Increasingly 
configured as garrison-entrepots (Roitman 2005), they may provide sufficient guarantees of order 
and protection to sustain organized commerce. This is evident in the case of Somalia where despite 
the fragmentation of political authority, the export of livestock from across the sub-region to trading 
partners across the Gulf of Aden thrives, unfettered by enforceable national boundaries or 
governance regimes (Stepputatt and Hagmann 2016; Little, Tikki, Websu 2015). In a different 
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symbiosis of trade and violence, in nearby Djibouti a concession-dependent microstate serves 
French, US, and now Chinese military interests and regional markets as war and political instability 
rage nearby (Dua 2017).  
Revealing distinct political entailments challenging the transcendence of the nation-state form, the 
neoliberalization of port spaces, in short, is never an economic proposition alone. Availed foremost – 
but not singularly -- by the intensification of maritime flows, this occurs hand-in-hand with other 
features of the post-cold war, post-GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) epoch . From the 
rise of securitization and humanitarian intervention, to the resurgence of regional integration, 
private concession economies, and on-going state breakdown, all of these processes are in play 
across the African continent, inflecting maritime conditions and seaport functions and 
configurations.  
2. Off shore exploitation  
Since the colonial era, the extraction of natural and mineral resources was based on enclaves, where 
capital was allowed to act free from state intervention. This rationale led to violent forms of labor 
mobilization and resources transfer towards colonial metropoles. Mineral exploitation is the oldest 
example of the establishment of autonomous territories freed from responsibility over their social 
and environmental impact. After Independence, inspired by nationalist ideologies, Africa’s 
developmental states sometimes intervened to mitigate the negative impacts of extractive enclave 
economies - with the exception of the oil sector, which remained largely in the hands of former 
colonial powers and later the new capitalist empire: the United States. Indeed, oil refining, the 
highest added-value activity, has always been at the monopoly of international oil conglomerates, 
many closely tied to US partners and shareholders. 
At the beginning of the 21st century, the emphasis on security together with neoliberal policies have 
led to further expansion of offshore economy in the oil and gas sector. International companies took 
advantage of the state roll-back to promote the exploitation of the seabed and adjoining subsea 
assets. The widespread outsourcing of the different functions of the state has also favored foreign 
capital investments and offshoring in Africa (Ferguson 2005).  Learning from the experience of on- 
and near-shore oil finds (Adunbi 2015; Watts 2005), one strategy of offshore oil is to push away 
environmental and social claims to protect business from political liabilities while playing into the 
hands of key state interests, as in Equatoria Guinea (Appel 2012) and Angola (Reed 2009). In doing 
so, the mineral economy becomes invisible and more importantly, inaccessible, to a large range of 
national actors, despite the huge share of national assets it represents. Concerning the rising tide of 
mineral extraction from far-shore sites, this strategy skirts both security risks and national 
accountability by transferring crude directly from offshore sources to high seas and beyond (floating 
production storage and offloading vessels are located far out at sea). Thus, capital and oil flows 
increasingly follow the mobilities of the global economy, escaping the sticky social constraints and 
accountabilities of national development agendas and equity claims. With emergent extractive 
geographies going hand in hand with the rise of off-shore political economies detached from the 
demand and territories of nation-states, since 2012, 95% of the top-20 Africa’s oil and gas discoveries 
were offshore (PWC 2016).  
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In the meantime, national civil society organizations and global NGOs, as well as international 
financial institutions with development concerns have amplified their mobilizations around the 
environmental and social impacts of offshore oil (Soares de oliveira 2007 a). The number of actors, 
questioning the social responsibility of international oil companies and the state governance 
practices supporting oil exploitation, have also increased. The collusion between African national 
political elites and the international capitalist corporations (Soares de Oliveira 2007 b) led to raising 
demands for transparency in oil deals, the assessment of local impacts of oil production, and for the 
improvement of social benefits. With the expansion of the enclave economy to maritime spaces, the 
pressures on the states to bring back the rent-based accumulation from oil from off to onshore have 
also augmented. As a result, beyond codes of conduct of the private sector and the public 
accountability, local content policies strived to increase the economic ‘trickle-down effect’ of oil 
exploitation (Ovadia 2016). Companies operating in African seas and oceans, started to foster 
employment and sub-contracts through training and incentives in favor of national firms. However, 
this policy had varying levels of success in different countries. While in Nigeria, a large amount of 
foreign capital from oil exploitation had been diffused into the Nigerian economy – the national 
capture of annual investment in oil and gas is around 40% - , only a tiny part was retained in Angola 
(Ovadia 2016). In Ghana, national companies lacking capital were unable to reap off the benefit from 
the oil rent (Ablo 2015). Nevertheless, the issue of equitable access to oil rent was rarely addressed 
by African governments. In Nigeria this issue has been the source of ongoing dissent and 
mobilizations around oil (Adunbi 2015; Watts 2004). In Africa national oil companies are still islands 
of power and wealth that keep their resources away from the rest of the economy (Soares de 
Oliveira 2007 a). 
Beyond the local content policies aiming at bringing the offshore oil accumulation on shore, certain 
states use also legal means to this end by redefining their sovereignty on maritime domain. For 
example, despite its dependency on foreign capital for exploration and exploitation of oil, Ghana has 
adjusted its legal framework to enforce port control measures to the offshore rigs, storage 
infrastructure at sea and offload vessels (Chalfin 2015). In addition, by extending its national 
legislation about coastal waters to the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) waters around the rigs, Ghana 
sought also to secure national appropriation of maritime territory. This legal redefinition of maritime 
areas surrounding the exploitation sites is a way to reassert the state sovereignty vis-à-vis offshore 
capital (Chalfin 2015). However this reaffirmation of state sovereignty could be at the expense of 
various other maritime actors. The spatial occupation of the Gulf of Guinea for offshore oil and the 
sprawl of its safety zones led to the eviction of Ghanaian fishers from fishing grounds. In Nigeria 
artisanal fisheries and trawlers are affected by the numerous wells in the EEZ, as their fishing areas 
are shrinking due to the extension of security areas.  
Conflicts around access to maritime territories and the impact of oil drilling on ecosystems open up 
new questions about the offshore hydrocarbons. Increasingly, fishers and other groups are mobilizing 
against these infrastructures (Ackah-Baidoo 2013). This resistance and mobilizations affect 
private/public deals shaped by the rationale of containment given the priorities of international oil 
companies. The logics of deregulation and calls for reregulation in the Gulf of Guinea have made the 
controversies about maritime governance evident. Despite all, the environmental principles that 
inspire the legal framework of seabed exploitation still stem from private sources. Its enforcement is 
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rarely guided by public law, which can explain the weak responsibilities of private companies in case 
of incident. The mobilizations about potential pollution on offshore zones are still weak, as the 
exploitation is far from the shore. 
Another major concern about offshore oil drilling in the Gulf of Guinea is its inclination to propel 
conflicts around maritime borders between nation states as well as new rounds of maritime 
adjudication, as between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire. In a context of blurred limits due to the lack of 
agreements under the Law Of the Sea convention institutions, international oil companies stimulate 
conflicts amidst increasing competition about access to resources (Roitman and Rosso 2001). Indeed, 
international capital and its accumulation interests clearly lead to more conflicts between states 
about the borders of EEZs. These conflicts around the appropriation of mineral resources are 
especially acute in African coastal countries, where national economies are highly dependent on 
these resources and lack other alternatives. With an absence of a regional institutional framework to 
settle these conflicts, maritime sovereignty becomes intertwined with private and public interests at 
various scales. Thus, nation-states’ claims over their maritime territories within the jurisdictions of 
international maritime law are supported by competing international oil companies. In Equatorial 
Guinea the discovery of new oil fields has triggered conflicts with neighboring countries - Cameroon 
and Nigeria (Roitman and Rosso 2001). Nevertheless, these conflicts sometimes entail the 
emergence of transnational networks of power, leading to new cooperation strategies, notably in 
Nigeria and São Tomé and Principe (Frynas, Wood and Soares de Oliveira 2003).  
3. Security, piracy and illegal activities 
The boom in maritime trade and off shore exploitation since the beginning of the century has also 
stimulated conflicts over the appropriation of blue wealth. Globalization facilitated the expansion of 
the maritime trade and the accumulation of wealth in the hands of international companies that try 
to avoid any form of redistribution to onshore societies. The expansion of sea transport activities and 
off shore mineral exploitation tend also to boost piracy, ranging from the hijacking of large cargo 
ships from the Somalian coast to the Indian Ocean to attacks on offshore oil stations in the Gulf of 
Guinea. The preoccupation with thwart these illegal forms of accumulation enables the expansion of 
the security nexus to all African coasts and high seas.  
The coasts and seas of Eastern Africa have been the main battlefields of international maritime 
forces seeking to protect the Suez strait and strategic passage way for international merchant fleets. 
The acts of piracy in the Gulf of Aden started at the beginning of this century, when the Somalian 
state faced violent insurgency. The regional war economy and the relative autonomy of Puntland and 
its warlords took piracy to new heights. Pirates, who were themselves acting within a moral economy 
of protection and sovereignty, initially targeted foreign illegal fishing trawlers and toxic waste 
dumping (Marchal 2011). But progressively, they seized large container ships and tankers. The 
increase in pirate assaults, the escalation of violence and the expansion of this violence to a larger 
territory of the Indian Ocean was partly due to the weakness of national Navies in the region and 
could only be halted by an international intervention (Bueger 2015, Vreÿ 2009). While the reasons 
underpinning these violent practices are complex – intertwining legal and illegal practices and 
resources (Dua 2015) – and not well understood by international actors, the global answer was to 
maintain the presence of foreign naval forces in the Indian Ocean, together with private armed 
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guards to secure merchant ships (Marchal 2011).  The deployment of naval forces of powerful 
countries aimed at ensuring the free circulation of goods. Despite the fact that these international 
operations were not always in full compliance with international law (Bueger 2015), they managed to 
establish the security of trade in the region.  
The externalization of security opens up new problems beyond the ethical and legal ones. Namely, it 
weakens the capacity of states in the region to take in charge of international maritime security 
agenda. Given the fluidity of the careers between coastguards and pirates, international means have 
been previously used for shadow activities (Dua 2013 and 2015). As a consequence, the international 
community has turned to countries with sufficient and well managed naval power, cultivating both 
regional cooperation and regional hegemons. South Africa, though far from the epi-center of 
maritime vulnerability, emerged as the center of this approach to regional security within an 
institutional framework that includes all other eastern and southern African states. This is supported 
by international actors, like the United States, which not only promote the strengthening of regional 
naval powers for maritime surveillance and military interventions, but also of the African Union for 
the enforcement of international and regional laws (Baker 2011).While piracy crisis was ongoing in 
East Africa, a new front opened in West Africa. Since the beginning of this century, the offshore 
exploitation of mineral resources had been thriving in the Gulf of Guinea. But these were also 
destabilized by oil conflicts ongoing since several decades. In the Niger Delta, access claims over oil 
wealth had contributed to the growth of piracy targeting ships, tankers and oil rigs and to instability 
in the maritime area. Due to the networks of violent Niger Delta oil smugglers and their insertion in a 
regional criminal system, assaults have spread from the Nigeria EEZ to the high seas and other 
national maritime territories (ICG 2012). Since 2010, the pirate attacks increased exponentially in the 
Gulf of Guinea, including robberies targeting ports and boats, kidnappings for ransoms, hijackings 
with trans-boarding of contraband oil in the high see territory (ICG 2012). The high mobility of these 
groups, their capacity to corrupt state agents and enroll new fighters explain in large part their ability 
to escape the strong naval force of Nigeria. The dissemination of criminal acts at the regional scale 
are also related to the lack of capacity of the naval forces of the countries neighboring Nigeria as well 
as to growing smuggling economy under neoliberal policies in the Gulf of Guinea (ICG 2012).  
Despite the increase in the number of recorded hijackings and robberies at the sea, the situation of 
the Gulf of Guinea is not fully comparable with Eastern Africa. In 2017, only three acts of piracy in the 
international waters were reported by International Maritime Organization (IMO) in the Gulf, but 
fifteen in 2016 and eight in 2015 –  
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/PiracyArmedRobbery/Reports/Pages/Default.aspx 
consulted August 21th 2018.  Approximately , forty acts of piracy have been recorded every year in 
West Africa since 2010, but the definition of piracy is very broad including simple robberies. It is 
reported that three quarters of acts recorded as piracy are simple robberies with amounts taken 
valued at US$ 10,000 to US$ 15,000 gains (UNODC 2013). Furthermore, most of these assaults were 
concentrated on the ports, territorial waters, and nearby areas. All of these indicate that in the 
absence of generalized piracy, the focus of the international maritime agenda in the Gulf of Guinea is 
not to fight an existing threat but to thwart a potential threat. This construction of piracy as a 
potential threat in West Africa is related to international pressure to promote maritime free trade, 
increase military cooperation, and tighten law enforcement. To control the violence sprawling from 
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regional economy of smuggling – due to collusions between state agents, companies’ members and 
organized crime - the oil industry has opted for the privatization of security on the rigs and boats. 
Outsourcing security to local vigilantes or private companies generates new problems, notably in 
terms of sovereignty (ICG 2012). The concession of violence to private groups by the military-oil 
nexus is often the source of violence directed against “local villains” or even neighboring states. The 
competition for offshore resources creates additional instability in the Gulf, as illegal agents take 
advantage of the lacunae in laws owing to lack of harmonization. The absence of military cooperation 
is sometimes also rooted in the violent strategies of destabilization fueled by states themselves 
(Frynas, Wood and R. Soares de Oliveira 2003). 
The international experts from the European Union and United States support the extension of the 
role for regional institutions to spearhead cooperation and common action in the domain of 
surveillance, police activities and security interventions (Vreÿ 2009 and Coelho 2013). However, if 
necessary legal framework and infrastructure for cooperation are missing, the states with strong 
naval forces can also attempt to establish control and use this as an argument for justify their 
influence. This is the case of Nigeria in the Gulf of Guinea or South-Africa in the Indian Ocean. Even 
though the cooperation is in progress – especially in the latter region - distrust among the 
governments prevails.  
The push for maritime security is now spreading to other domains like illegal fishing1 (Bueger and 
Stockbruegger 2016). This trend undermines the cooperation between state and fishing 
communities, in a context of a growing antagonism and conflict over fishing grounds compounded by 
a race to secure sea lanes and oil rigs. In addition, certain fishing communities are stigmatized as 
smugglers, especially through security analysis focused on illegal fishing and shadow economy.  The 
emphasis on illegal fishing and its security impact fails to distinguish between fishing activities that 
do not respect environmental norms and those that count as criminal activities. The consequence is 
the militarization of fishery police, arguably to help curve fraudulent behavior and impede the 
proliferation of criminal networks at the sea (de coning and Witbooi 2015). However, this policy can 
lead to violent confrontations between fishers and coastguards, for example in South Africa for shell 
fisheries (Norton 2015). The focus on such conflicts can help to look away from the South-African 
political elite involvement in the illegal lobster fishery (Standing 2017). It could also indirectly draw 
military bodies into expanding network of criminal activities. This is the case of Guinee Bissau coastal 
areas, where military agents take advantage of foreign artisanal or industrial illegal fishermen to 
extract bribes or benefit from drugs in transit (Klute and Fernandes 2014).  
The focus of this century on the security policies does not take into account political factors in the 
functioning of African states, since they are only seen as deficient in the exercise of maritime power. 
It obscures their methods of government which intertwines both public and private strategies and 
legal and illegal practices. The externalization of security is not an appropriate answer to lack of 
regional cooperation, since this reinforces privatization of the states, weakening the states’ 
institutional capacities and strategies. As transactions between state agents, fishers and private 
                                                          
1
 According to the FAO, illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing is illegal when fishing activities are not 
reported and infringe upon the rules regulating the quantities of catch, fishing locations and periods, the size of 
fish. These are considered as threats to regulations aiming to ensure the sustainability of fish resources. 
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actors are reconfigured by security agenda, its appropriation unfold through new conflicts that 
transform maritime government in the continent.  
4. Sea conservation 
As security issue spills over to illegal fishing, new tensions between African states and fishing 
communities manifest themselves in new domains of intervention for international policy and action. 
While the norms for preventing the illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing and the Food and 
agriculture organization of the United Nations code of conduct for responsible fisheries are 
disseminating all over the continent, shipping pollution and marine conservation as global 
environmental protection are also defined as security issues, notably by international actors, such as 
the EU since 2000’s. The marine conservation policies are gaining importance thanks to the UN 
sustainable development goals agenda, notably the goal 14 on sea and ocean governance that focus 
on the sustainable exploitation of different types of marine resources. Blue growth is now a strategic 
target of development for African coastal states, which include sustainable exploitation in their 
development planning (Economic commission for Africa 2016).  Different kinds of maritime resource 
exploitation are now brought under scrutiny to limit their impacts on marine and coastal ecosystems. 
Laws and norms about marine environments are being integrated into environmental regulations 
passed by African governments. These range from fishing methods to creation of no-take zones, from 
port management to control of boats at the open seas.  
The EEZ extends 200 nautical miles from the coast. Under the LOS convention, it can further be 
extended if the states can prove the continuity of their continental shelf. In general, special fishing 
agreements allow foreign trawlers to use the EEZs in Africa and include financial compensations. 
Through these arrangements, vast zones are opened and made accessible to industrial trawlers 
mainly from European Union and China, in exchange for a fraction (4% to 8%) of their captures to 
host counties in West African EEZs (Belhabib 2015). While the capacity of capture and the mobility of 
international trawling fleet is quite substantial, their monitoring has been proven difficult given the 
lack of means and capacity. For example, during the 1990’s, a fishing agreement signed between the 
European Union and Mauritania allowed trawlers based in Spanish Canary islands to buy cheap 
licenses for low priced fish and engage in illegal fishing of certain valuable species. They also  
underreported their captures. These practices reduced the fish stocks targeted by foreign trawlers in 
Mauritanian waters and affected the performance of national fishing (Ould Ahmed Salem 2009). In 
Africa, the absence of strong state regulation and control, and in the presence of a state bureaucracy 
prone to bribery and corruption, international fishing agreements tend to fuel illegal fishing.  Gaps 
about fishing in criminal law, the lack of equipment and means to enforce fishing laws and 
regulations beyond national coastal waters also play an important part in such an outcome. 
The lack of respect for rules fixing industrial fishing zones or the underestimation of the actual 
catching capacity is frequent. In coastal areas, conservation policies create multiple resource conflicts 
and are strongly contested by local actors. These conflicts and contestations are particularly acute in 
artisanal fisheries. The governments are eager to control artisanal fishing; and give priority to foreign 
and industrial fishing. This situation has been exacerbated by the blue growth agenda, which allows 
large parts of coastal areas to be allocated for tourism, port infrastructures and shipping expansion, 
restraining local artisanal fishing territories. The distrust towards governmental regulation has been 
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further heightened by successive attempts to force artisanal fishermen to be tracked by GPS 
technology. In Senegal, these attempts were staunchly resisted by the fishermen’s unions. Until they 
have been “persuaded” by the “security” argument, the Senegalese artisanal fishermen considered 
these measures as attempts to control local fishing activities without any effort to reduce and 
regulate industrial fisheries. During the past twenty years, governments started to develop soft law 
and policy measures in fisheries to ensure the conservation of marine resource and ecosystems. 
Several regional approaches aiming to integrate policies focused on ecosystem dynamics are under 
development. For example, recently, a sub-regional fisheries commission has been created in order 
to regulate fishing at a scale larger than the national EEZs in West Africa. This aims to preserve large 
ecological networks linked to the upwelling system. Yet, in parallel to this institutional framework, 
the individual states are still continuing to negotiate commercial agreements with European Union’s 
or other foreign fleets.  
Originally, the fisheries agreements passed between Europe and African, Caribbean and the Pacific 
countries at the turn of this century had the purpose of supporting scientific research and 
introducing regulatory measures to improve the sustainability of fish stocks and marine ecosystems. 
However, the control of finances allocated by these agreements to promote sustainable 
management of the national fishing sector had been difficult to trace. The concern over the unequal 
terms of exchange and the difficulties to ensure a sustainable management of the national fishing 
sector let to their re-examination and re-negotiation (Guillotreau and al 2011). This opened up the 
door for new international actors, operating within the fishing industry but less concerned with 
environmental responsibility, to step in. The fisheries agreements between China and West African 
countries is a good example of this new trend, characterized by lack transparency enabling, among 
other things, unreported fishing. 
The new fishing concessions are sometimes directly negotiated with private actors, beyond any kind 
of cooperation framework between states. The trawlers that replaced the EU fishing fleet are not 
subject to the European environmental norms (Standing 2017). In addition, governments pass also 
deals with these new actors in order to obtain financial revenues without having to honor the claims 
of national artisanal fisheries actors. The sustainability of such contracts is difficult to assess, as they 
involve a host of partners. This also hinders the accountability of this kind of marine resources 
exploitation and governance. For example, the multiplicity of parties makes it impossible for fishing 
unions to calculate the amount of fish exports related to the foreign trawlers. The transparency of 
these agreements is also weak because they are linked to vested interests of governments and 
different institutions within the states (Standing 2017). 
Creating Marine Protected Area’s and Marine Parks gained also importance as an alternative way to 
address the protection of seas. Under the impetus of international conservation organizations 
African states have established new MPA’s and these are now burgeoning everywhere in coastal 
areas. These areas are established with the claim that they will achieve multiple conservation and 
development goals, ranging from restoring fishing stocks at the periphery of no-take zones to 
fostering ecotourism through ecosystem enhancement. The multiple sustainability goals are difficult 
to achieve in a context where local right holders do not participate in the formulation of MPA’s 
design, and are not involved in the management. Rather, this has the potential to reinforce state 
power, as it is the case of the Mafia Island Marine National Park in Tanzania. There, government 
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agents, relying on their old networks of power, excluded inhabitants of the island from participating 
in decision making regarding the definition of conservation objectives. This resulted in undermining 
of their former resource access rights in new touristic zones (Walley 2004). Similarly in Senegal’s 
Saloum Delta, the creation of a putative “community reserve” by the Senegalese state and a national 
NGO has also entailed enclosures that dispossessed the fishermen by excluding them  from their 
former fishing territories and depriving them from coastal resources, such as shells and mangrove 
wood (Dahou et al 2004).  The fiction of community management that conservation NGOs promote is 
often to maintain their funding and to impose their objectives with the support of a tiny local elite 
that could benefit from touristic activities (Dahou and Ould cheikh 2007). Their approach based on 
autochthonous management rules stimulates conflicts between local and artisanal migrant fisheries 
(Dahou 2010). The granting of touristic concessions to urban or foreign investors may heighten 
tensions between local actors and the state. Conservation of coastal zones becomes a highly 
contested area of policy that intertwines various powers at different scales, at the expense of the 
poorest segments of artisanal fisheries. 
Large-scale projects of coastal conservation are based on a peculiar link between science and policy 
that exclude local knowledge and populations from decision-making. This approach tends to poorly 
address poverty issues in sustainability goals and strengthens a central and bottom up governance of 
coastal areas. Even when social concerns are presented as important issues, technical solutions are 
privileged and very few resources are dedicated to further involvement of coastal populations in the 
programs’ design and management (Odendaal and al. 2015). These policies result in the 
marginalization of large categories of people, whose livelihoods are dependent on ecosystems, and 
could lead them into illegal marine exploitation. The states that aim ecosystems enhancement with 
various commitments and strategies could be seen as respectful of environmental norms. Yet, these 
norms increase the private appropriation of the ocean through touristic concessions or other kind of 
capitalist investments like coastal residential areas. The construction of an artificial island in Lagos, 
allegedly to counter coastal erosion, favor housings speculation and imply erosion of peripheral areas 
populated with fishers (Mendelsohn, 2018). The maritime actors face a process of environmental 
normalization and spatial enclosure, as the exploitation of maritime resources are liberalized and, 
with it, they are stripped of their incomes. In spite of the definition of the UN development goal 14 as 
a way to overcome poverty, the instruments to address sustainability of coastal marine areas 
continue to generate inequities in access to marine spaces and resources. 
Conclusion 
As this chapter shows, governing the seas and oceans in Africa is increasingly dependent on the 
neoliberal security complex. The market institutions and free circulation of commodities rest on 
security policies, which put multiple strains on African states and societies. In this context, migration 
towards Europe or Asia is considered as outside the scope of market freedom, and this security 
agenda is imposed by international actors, who, through the transfer of means, also try to transfer 
their own norms and priorities to African countries. Nevertheless, the EU Frontex (European Border 
and Coast Guard Agency) instrument to hinder migration in the nearby areas of African waters has 
just led to the redeployment of West-African maritime routes to Europe towards the Mediterranean 
Sea. Today maritime governance in Africa is dependent on global institutions and international 
powers to provide them with necessary means to control their maritime territories. They don’t have 
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enough room and opportunities to renegotiate the content of these policy transfers. However power 
asymmetries do not prevent African states and societies from influencing the rules of this complex 
game and to direct new resources according to their interests and alternative goals – especially when 
foreign governments have difficulties in intervening directly in their sovereignty domains. Even in 
ports, where state sovereignty domain is challenged due to extended influence of global economic 
forces, national priorities are maintained and these forces are directed to contribute to the 
reaffirmation of state power.   
National and local actors find also opportunities in neoliberal deregulation and security to bypass 
global maritime regulations. The expansion of world fish market stimulates opportunities of 
enrichment within the African states, especially when the fight against IUU fishing is undermined by 
the lack of harmonization and enforcement of environmental and criminal laws at national and 
regional scale. The control at sea is an incomplete answer , since illegal fishing is supported by states 
segments and national elites. The heightened concern for illegal fishing in the sustainability target of 
the blue growth is sometimes viewed as an opportunity for states to acquire new resources and to 
control further maritime spaces in order to re-negotiate regulations and terms of access with 
maritime actors. The states can take advantage of it to allow artisanal fishers to accumulate through 
illegal fishing only to limit contestations against foreign trawlers or denunciation of smuggling (Dahou 
2018) and drug trafficking activities (Haysom, Gastrow and Shaw 2018), in which state actors are 
involved. 
Playing the offshore game becomes a strategy to extend state control over maritime territories, 
sometimes through legal means, other times through illegal practices. The affirmation of sovereignty 
and non-interference are at the heart of state strategies aiming to maintain their prerogatives and to 
reshape global maritime governance in their own ways. Designated as weak states in terms of 
maritime control, African states are able to draw international resources towards their own agenda 
and combine private and public norms and actors in paradoxical regulations.  
In different African countries, various forms of privatization of the state (Hibou 2004) can emerge 
independently of their coercive nature or the intensity of their armed conflicts. It occurs through 
various dynamics, how ranging from the concession of security domains to private companies or its 
outsourcing to violent groups beyond the legal framework, to law bending of public servants and 
militaries involved in shadow economy. Even if the military means are increased, they can contribute 
to the outsourcing of violence or the direct involvement of state segments in illegal activities. 
Privatization of the state doesn’t erase its power vis-à-vis international actors; it reconfigures it in 
articulation between various private agents of crony capitalism, national elites with vested interests 
in offshore, and to criminal groups at different scales. Sovereignty becomes then co-defined through 
new laws, agreements and occult deals, fueled by local conflicts and by the dialectic of possession 
and dispossession among various segments of national maritime actors. The territorialization of 
maritime governance results from these power dynamics and reactions to them, including also illegal 
activities and mobilities.  
As shown by Thompson (1996) for piracy of the modern period, sovereignty is a social construct, and 
Nation states still govern the sea through moving the boundaries between terrestrial and maritime 
territories and between public and private regulations (Dahou 2009). Understanding maritime 
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governance process requiresattending to forms of deregulation and to new forms of regulation as 
well as to the spatialization of control and power – throughenforcing the law and bending the law 
(Dahou 2017). African states govern their seas by constantly shifting and blurring the boundaries 
between private and public and between legal and illegal. 
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